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DETERMINISM AND DIVINE BLAME
John Ross Churchill
Theological determinism is, at first glance, difficult to square with the typi-
cal Christian commitment to the appropriateness of divine blame. How, we 
may wonder, can it be appropriate for God to blame someone for something 
that was determined to occur by God in the first place? In this paper, I try to 
clarify this challenge to Christian theological determinism, arguing that its 
most cogent version includes specific commitments about what is involved 
when God blames wrongdoers. I then argue that these commitments are not 
essential to divine blame, and that there are plausible alternative accounts 
of such blame that would not court similar challenges. I end with a case for 
the intelligibility of divine blame within theological determinism, in light of 
its possible similarity in relevant respects to certain instances of intelligible 
human blame.
I. Introduction
It is a great irony of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein that the creator is so mon-
strous. Having built and animated his creation, Victor abandons him at 
the first signs of life, leaving his creature with no one to care for or guide 
him, in a world that will receive him only as a source of fear and disgust. 
This mistreatment makes it hard to accept the legitimacy of Victor’s later 
condemnation of his creature, leading many of us to recoil at tirades like 
the following:
“Why do you call to my remembrance,” I rejoined, “circumstances, of which 
I shudder to reflect, that I have been the miserable origin and author? Cursed 
be the day, abhorred devil, in which you first saw light! Cursed (although I 
curse myself) be the hands that formed you! You have made me wretched 
beyond expression. You have left me no power to consider whether I am just 
to you or not. Begone! relieve me from the sight of your detested form.”1
Indeed, we may find ourselves sympathizing with the creature as he ad-
dresses his “heartless creator” and asks, “Why did you form a monster so 
hideous that even you turned from me in disgust?”2
1Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, 101.
2Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, 139 and 130. 
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Accusations are likewise hard to stomach when the accuser himself 
has orchestrated the wrongful action. Iago may not have created and sub-
sequently abandoned anyone in his campaign against Othello. But we 
are nevertheless repulsed at his indictment of Othello’s beloved Cassio, 
having watched Iago manipulate Cassio into committing his crime.
Given all this, what are we to make of a being who exercises total con-
trol over another’s wrongdoing and yet still blames the perpetrator for 
that wrongdoing? How much more should we recoil when the blamer’s 
control over the wrongdoer’s actions extends beyond the creation of the 
wrongdoer, and beyond even an ability to play expertly upon his desires, 
fears, and the like?
This sentiment—the judgment that someone with total control over 
another’s behavior cannot appropriately blame the person so controlled—
forms the basis of an objection to an account of God’s sovereignty that is 
quite popular in many Christian denominations, an account we will refer 
to here as theological determinism. This account has been championed in 
the past by influential Christian theologians like John Calvin and Jona-
than Edwards, and it claims many adherents in the academy and churches 
today. Because Christian theological determinists want to affirm both total 
divine control over human behavior and the appropriateness of divine 
blame, they face a direct threat from considerations like those above.
In the sections to come, I first introduce this deterministic approach 
to God’s sovereignty and contrast it with competing approaches. I then 
present what I take to be the strongest objection to the appropriateness of 
divine blame on this approach, drawing in part from recent articulations 
of this objection. My response will be to highlight and reject some of the 
assumptions about divine blame that are implicit in the challenge, and to 
suggest plausible alternative conceptions of divine blame that would not 
court similar challenges. I then close with a case for the intelligibility of 
divine blame within theological determinism, one that trades on analo-
gous instances of intelligible human blame. If these considerations are 
cogent, they would provide a way for those who wish to endorse both the 
all-encompassing divine sovereignty of theological determinism and the 
appropriateness of divine blame to do so without fear of incoherence or 
the need to appeal to mystery on these matters.
This would be a modest conclusion, but an important one nonethe-
less. For determinism of the relevant sort remains a common view among 
theologians, clergy, and laypeople alike, even if it is a fringe view among 
Christian philosophers. And unlike its rivals, this account does not require 
that humans have libertarian free will, and so it is not hostage to the same 
empirical fortunes as libertarianism. It would be significant, then, to know 
that a popular Christian view of God’s sovereignty that is compatible with 
a wide range of discoveries in the science of human agency is fully con-
sistent with, and intelligible with respect to, traditional commitments on 
divine blame.
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II. Preliminary Matters
Before tackling these topics, however, some preliminary clarifications are 
in order.
First, it’s important to note that the present paper is focused on di-
vine blame, and not on human moral responsibility. These are related 
concepts, to be sure. For one condition on the appropriateness of God’s 
blaming is that those who are blamed are morally responsible, in a sense 
that is sufficient for them to be worthy of blame.3 Even so, the question of 
whether a wrongdoer is worthy of blame is distinct from the question of 
whether some specific person may appropriately blame that wrongdoer. 
If I knowingly aid in your act of theft, for example, it may be that I cannot 
legitimately blame you, despite the fact that you are fully blameworthy 
for the act.4
Second, and similar to the first point, care must be taken not to conflate 
divine blame with divine punishment in what follows. For blame and 
punishment are plausibly distinct5—I may blame you without thereby 
punishing you—even if considerations about the appropriateness of 
blame are relevant to considerations about the appropriateness of punish-
ment.6 As before, my focus here is on divine blame, and not on this related 
but distinct concept. This will be especially important to keep in mind 
in later sections, lest my proposed solution to an apparent problem for 
divine blame be misinterpreted as something that is intended to handle 
certain worries about divine punishment. (And it may be that what helps 
a lot in the former case is of much less use in the latter.)
Finally, I want to make clear that the aim here is not to defend theo-
logical determinism as the best account of divine sovereignty. Rather, my 
goal is simply to defend it against a rather thorny objection—an objection 
that can lead philosophers to dismiss it as a live option. While I ultimately 
conclude that this position ought not to be dismissed on these grounds, I 
remain agnostic as to whether it is superior to any of its rivals, all things 
considered.
3I assume a concept of moral responsibility on which a responsible wrongdoer is one who 
is worthy of or deserves blame regardless of any consequences that might follow from that blame. 
I do so because I believe it to be common within the Christian tradition and standard in 
challenges to theological determinism. This concept can be contrasted with views on which 
blame is simply not something that anyone ever deserves, such that blaming is only justified 
on instrumental grounds. For more on this distinction, see Michael McKenna, Conversation 
and Responsibility, 114–148, and Derk Pereboom, “Libertarianism and Theological Deter-
minism,” 113–119.
4See the discussion in section 2.2.2 of Neal Tognazzini and Justin Coates, “Blame.” 
5McKenna offers several distinctions between punishment and blame in his Conversation 
and Responsibility. For example, punishment often has a tit-for-tat structure (e.g., eye for eye) 
that is atypical of blame (142). And it is possible to blame offenders without intending any 
harm to them, while this is not possible in cases of punishment (144–146). 
6Perhaps it’s worth clarifying that I will not be arguing (and I do not assume) that there 
are cases in which God is entitled to blame someone but not entitled to punish them, in the 
way these two entitlements often come apart for humans. This is no part of my strategy later 
in the paper.
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III. Theological Determinism
This is not the place to rehearse in detail the various approaches to divine 
sovereignty within the Christian tradition.7 For present purposes, it will 
be enough to highlight a distinctive characteristic of theological deter-
minism, and contrast this aspect of the position with all other approaches. 
This will provide sufficient background for the challenge and response to 
follow in later sections.
What distinguishes theological determinism from rival approaches is 
its affirmation that for any human action, the ultimate explanation as to why 
the person acted as he did rather than acting otherwise (or refraining from acting) 
is that God determined that he would so act. For example, while there are no 
doubt natural explanations for Peter’s third denial of Christ—Peter’s fear 
was surely a cause, for instance—the determinist will insist that the fun-
damental reason why Peter sinned precisely as he did rather than acting 
otherwise is that God determined that he would sin in just that way.
It is true, of course, that alternatives to determinism also accord a role 
to God’s will in the explanation of all human actions. Molinists and open 
theists, for example, both affirm that God’s creation and conservation 
are necessary conditions for such actions, and they may affirm that in 
some cases God specifically determines such actions in the strong sense 
articulated above. But both groups deny that in all cases, the ultimate ex-
planation as to why an agent acted as she did rather than acting otherwise 
(or refraining from action) is that God determined it to be so—preferring 
in at least some cases to root the explanation in the agent herself or to deny 
that there is any such explanation. Theological determinists part ways 
with proponents of both groups in affirming, as Thomas Flint has put it, 
that “all actions are determined ultimately by events external to and not 
under the causal control of their agents,”8 with God as the external source 
in question.
Similarly, there are many views of divine sovereignty on which God 
exercises providential control over human affairs.9 But the degree of di-
vine control exercised according to the different views will vary along a 
spectrum, with determinism as the limiting case of total divine control in 
virtue of God’s specific determination of all human behavior.10
7Others have done so admirably. For articulations and defense of the Molinist approach 
to divine sovereignty, see for example Thomas Flint’s Divine Providence: The Molinist Account 
and Kenneth Keathley’s Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach. Resources that favor 
open theism include William Hasker’s God, Time, and Knowledge and Providence, Evil, and 
the Openness of God, and John Sanders’s The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence. 
Theological determinism is defended in John S. Feinberg’s No One Like Him, Paul Helm’s The 
Providence of God and Eternal God, and Hugh J. McCann’s Creation and the Sovereignty of God.
8Flint, “Providence,” 331.
9See for example the discussions of divine providence within Molinist and Open Theist 
accounts in the resources listed above. 
10I take it that control assumes some kind of asymmetry—at the very least, if one thing 
controls another, then the second depends on the first in a way that the first does not depend 
on the second. This is true of theological determinism as presented above, in God’s control 
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Note, importantly, that theological determinism allows for a plurality 
of theories as to how God determines creatures’ behavior. It is thus consis-
tent with multiple positions on God’s relation to evil human actions and, 
relatedly, with multiple positions on the causal structure of the world. 
Various accounts of God’s control over human evil are on offer,11 but all 
parties agree that God’s reasons for determining such behavior will differ 
significantly from the reasons for determining good behavior, in such a 
way as to safeguard divine goodness; they will, in other words, agree with 
D. A. Carson that “God does not stand behind evil action in the way that 
he stands behind good action.”12 As far as the causal structure of the world 
is concerned, a theological determinist may, but need not, defend the truth 
of causal determinism. It is therefore open to her to claim that while (e.g.) 
the laws and the various physical and mental states of the world prior to 
Peter’s sin were jointly consistent with his acting virtuously, Peter’s denial 
was nevertheless determined by God.13
This leads to another important clarification. Theological determinism 
is sometimes understood in causal terms, e.g., as the thesis that God is 
the sufficient cause of everything that exists, or of everything that happens, 
within the creation.14 I take such characterizations to fit comfortably with 
my own. Even so, it’s important to keep in mind that theological deter-
minists need not (and should not) deny that behavior that is divinely 
determined is also typically caused by agents’ normal psychological states 
and processes. Divine determination, in other words, does not preclude 
the causation that we take to be crucial to ordinary, natural agency; it is 
fully consistent with Peter’s fears (beliefs, desires, etc.) counting as factors 
that contributed causally to his action.
Much more could be said about theological determinism and how it 
differs from its rivals. But the distinction above is what defines the position 
over what creatures there are, as well as what those creatures do and what happens to them. 
For an apparent account on which God is the cause of creatures and their behavior, but in 
a way that rejects any asymmetry (and thus control) of this sort, see W. Matthews Grant, 
“Divine Universal Causality and Libertarian Freedom.” 
11See for example Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, part IV, section XI, subsection III; 
Feinberg, No One Like Him, 651–656; Helm, Eternal God, 162–164, and The Providence of God, 
chs. 7–8; Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, 402–404; and McCann, Creation and the 
Sovereignty of God, ch. 6. See also Helm and Feinberg (respectively) on Calvin on this subject 
in John Calvin’s Ideas, 165–171, and No One Like Him, 696. Also helpful is Flint’s discussion (but 
not endorsement) of this issue within the position he calls “Thomism” in Divine Providence, 
87–94. Some of my comments in section IV are relevant as well. 
12Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility, 36. 
13McCann is an example of a theological determinist that rejects causal determinism, 
while Edwards affirms both theological and causal determinism. See McCann’s “Edwards 
on Free Will” and Creation and the Sovereignty of God, ch. 5, and Edwards’s Freedom of the Will, 
part II, section X. See also Feinberg’s No One Like Him, 716–718, and Flint’s discussion of the 
“Thomistic” approach in “Two Accounts of Providence,” 172–173, Divine Providence, 87, and 
“Divine Providence,” 266–268. 
14See Pereboom, “Libertarianism and Theological Determinism,” 112, and O’Connor, 
“Against Theological Determinism,” 133, respectively. 
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of interest, and it is what serves as the basis for philosophical challenges to 
its plausibility. I now turn now to one such challenge.15
IV. The Problem of Divine Blame
I noted earlier that the deterministic approach to divine sovereignty is 
popular across a number of Christian audiences. It’s not uncommon for 
members of these audiences to see this aspect of God’s nature as a cause 
for gratitude and love, and as a basis for peace and strength. For it means, 
among other things, that the God who loves them and who seeks their 
highest good has left no part of the divine plan for their lives vulnerable 
to defeat by imperfect creatures, protecting them from themselves no less 
than from others.16
However, there are elements of Christian theology that make this ac-
count of divine sovereignty much harder to celebrate. Indeed, one such 
element seems at first blush to render determinism implausible at best, 
and incoherent at worst. I’m speaking here of divine blame.
It doesn’t take much reflection to see the apparent difficulty. In addition 
to their preferred view of divine sovereignty, determinists typically want 
to affirm that God blames wrongdoers, where such blame is entirely ap-
propriate. That is, wrongdoers are taken to be worthy of blame, and God is 
counted among those who are entitled to blame them. But it is hard prima 
facie to see how theological determinists can coherently maintain both of 
these commitments. For it is not at all obvious how it can be appropriate 
for God to blame someone for wrongdoing that was due ultimately and 
specifically to divine determination. If, in other words, God determined 
Peter to act exactly as he did rather than otherwise—if divine determina-
tion was the ultimate explanation for that outcome—it is puzzling, to say 
15One might wonder why I have chosen the label “theological determinism,” or often 
simply “determinism,” rather than referring to this position via one of its more famous al-
leged proponents, as is common. In other words, why not Augustinianism, or Calvinism, or 
perhaps even Thomism? I prefer “determinism” because it is a term with some currency at 
present (see for example the many contributions in Kevin Timpe and Daniel Speak’s Free 
Will and Theism), and because it conveys only a fairly general thesis that is often attributed 
to these and other theologians without suggesting additional content peculiar to any one of 
them. (Gregory Boyd defends the endorsement of Augustine as a theological determinist in 
his Satan and the Problem of Evil, 249. Helm places Calvin in this tradition in John Calvin’s Ideas, 
170–171, and Calvin at the Centre, 259. In The God Who Risks, Sanders counts Luther [155] as a 
theological determinist alongside Augustine [149–153] and Calvin [156–157]. See the previous 
references to Edwards as theological determinist above. Flint presents Bañez and Leibniz as 
theological determinists, and thinks it possible that Aquinas may have held this position, 
too [“Two Accounts of Providence,” 149, “Providence,” 332]. Hodge falls in this category as 
well; see 440–441 of Vol. I and 301–302 of Volume II of his Systematic Theology, and Carson’s 
comments in Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility, 207 and 254n4. Note, importantly, 
that Jesse Couenhoven rejects the characterization of Augustine as a theological determinist 
[though not as “a kind of compatibilist”] in his Stricken by Sin, Cured by Christ, 13, 104–105.)
16See for example Charles Spurgeon’s comments on Matthew 20:15, quoted in Arthur W. 
Pink, The Attributes of God, 32–33. See also David Fergusson, Creation, 57; Martin Luther, The 
Bondage of the Will, 313; Pereboom, “Libertarianism and Theological Determinism,” 114–115; 
and Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, 441, and Vol. II, 301–302, the latter of which includes 
the gem “Who would not rather be governed by a Father than by a tornado?”
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the least, how it can be appropriate for God to blame Peter for that very 
action. Patrick Todd sums up this sentiment well in a recent paper:
[S]uppose you “wake up” to find yourself in an afterlife, during which time 
it is somehow made clear that everything you ever did was part of a divine 
preordained plan. And then God says to you: “You know, what you did on 
this occasion was really a horrible thing to have done. What’s your excuse? 
How could you?” Isn’t there something deeply unsettling about this sce-
nario? Wouldn’t you suppose that something had gone completely wrong? 
In the end, it simply seems to me that if God determines us to perform an 
action, he cannot blame us for having performed it. I do not know how to 
argue for this claim. I simply say that it is eminently plausible, and that we 
would need some very good reason to deny it.17
The apparent problem generalizes, of course, given that the view counts 
all human actions as divinely determined in this way. Moreover, it poses a 
significant challenge, as the reality and legitimacy of divine blame is taken 
as a staple of Christian belief across many traditions.18 It seems, then, that 
short of appeal to mystery, one cost of the deterministic account of divine 
sovereignty is the highly revisionist denial that God ever blames anyone 
for their wrongdoing.
Todd’s recent work in this space enables us to sharpen the objection 
a bit.19 What exactly is it about the degree of divine control that appears 
to undermine God’s ability to blame appropriately—God’s “standing to 
blame,” as it is sometimes called? What is driving the intuition that he 
articulates in the passage above?
It is not, Todd claims, that in determining that an act of wrongdoing 
will occur, God is therefore guilty of that same act or kind of wrongdoing.20 
God is not, that is, akin to a conspirator who cannot legitimately blame 
her co-conspirators, or to a dishonest citizen who lacks the standing to 
blame politicians for their lies. For in the relevant cases, the misdeeds are 
performed by human agents, not by God; the divine determination of a 
misdeed is distinct from the misdeed itself. Moreover, a creature’s wrong 
action will have been performed for one set of reasons—indeed, these 
reasons will be important to the action’s moral status—while God’s deter-
mination of that wrongdoing (along with its reasons) will have been for 
other reasons. Even on the determinist’s account, it was not God but Peter 
17Todd, “Manipulation and Moral Standing,” 16.
18See for example the treatment of divine wrath toward, or divine judgment of, sin in the 
following: Articles 4, 9, and 12 of The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion in J. I. Packer and R. T. 
Beckwith, 6–10; ch. VI, section VI and ch. XXXIII, section I of The Westminster Confession of 
Faith in A. A. Hodge, 115 and 389, respectively; and sections 678–679 of The Catechism of the 
Catholic Church, 194–195. 
19Note that Todd’s specific focus in the paper is on the kind of theological determinism 
that assumes causal determinism as well. (See 4–5 of “Manipulation and Moral Standing.”) 
But the aspects of his case to be considered below apply equally against theological deter-
minism more generally. 
20Todd, “Manipulation and Moral Standing,” 6–7. See also discussion of this point in 
Flint, “Divine Providence,” 269, and ch. 6 of McCann’s Creation and the Sovereignty of God. 
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who denied Christ, and Peter’s reasons for sinning were not God’s reasons 
for determining that Peter would do so. God’s determination of a wrong 
action does not entail that God has performed that same wrong action or 
an action that is sufficiently similar in kind and moral status.
Nor, Todd argues, is the apparent problem for divine blame due to 
God’s being at fault for the determination of the wrong behavior.21 For this 
would require that God acted wrongly in determining such behavior, like 
the mother who hypnotically induces her son to murder in The Manchu-
rian Candidate. And the determinist can avail herself of resources familiar 
to discussions of theodicy to reject this charge, such as the claim that 
divine determination of wrong action is ultimately morally justified on 
consequentialist grounds of one sort or another.22
I find Todd’s response plausible in each case. I also think he provides 
a cogent response to the charge that divine standing to blame would be 
undermined by God’s being complicit in the wrongdoing.23 Likewise for 
his response to the claim that in blaming those who have been divinely 
determined, God would thereby be professing to care about the moral 
values at stake in the wrongdoing while nevertheless behaving in ways 
that belie this profession.24
Even so, I cannot endorse Todd’s positive proposal, which is that the 
real problem for theological determinism in this context is ultimately one 
21Todd, “Manipulation and Moral Standing,” 9. 
22See Helm, Eternal God (162–164) and The Providence of God (213–215), and Steven B. 
Cowan and Greg A. Welty, “Pharaoh’s Magicians Redivivus,” 160–163, on these points. Note 
that I am not endorsing such consequentialism here, only claiming it as a strategy open to the 
theological determinist. See Feinberg’s No One Like Him, 787–795, and McCann’s Creation and 
the Sovereignty of God, 120–121, for alternative defenses against the charge above.
23Todd’s discussion is in “Manipulation and Moral Standing,” 10–11. Here is my gloss. 
Not all situations in which one person orchestrates the misbehavior of another are such that 
the first person lacks the standing to blame in virtue of being complicit in the misbehavior. 
For the orchestrator’s reasons matter quite a bit to our judgments here. After all, most of us 
accept that in at least some sting operations the undercover officers may legitimately blame 
the persons that have been apprehended. The lesson seems to be that one’s reasons for engi-
neering behavior factor into whether or not one is complicit in that behavior (or, if you prefer, 
into whether or not one’s complicity is of a sort that undermines one’s standing to blame 
others involved in the behavior). Given the rather weak assumption that the God of the 
theological determinist is motivated by reasons that are, morally speaking, more like those of 
a virtuous undercover agent than those of Iago, divine orchestration of wrongdoing is con-
sistent with God’s appropriately blaming the wrongdoer. I take these same considerations 
to count against Matt King’s conclusion that a divine determiner would lack the standing to 
blame. See King, “Manipulation Arguments and the Moral Standing to Blame,” 4–9. 
24See p. 7 of “Manipulation and Moral Standing” for Todd’s discussion. See also 
O’Connor’s “Against Theological Determinism,” 135–136. As an example of blame that 
would be illegitimate on these grounds, consider Claudius’s false endorsement of reverence 
for God and reverence for the dead in blaming Hamlet for his prolonged mourning, when 
Claudius himself has dishonored both of these through his recent actions. Todd argues, and I 
agree, that the determinist can use the resources of theodicy projects to respond here as well. 
For divine determination of an action does not entail divine moral approval of that action 
considered in itself, “in isolation from the rest of the story” (Todd, “Manipulation and Moral 
Standing,” 7). Nor does it entail divine scorn for or indifference toward the values flouted by 
that action, although it may entail that God subordinates these values to others. 
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about human moral responsibility, and not about the appropriateness of di-
vine blame per se. In particular, he argues that the problem with divine 
blame on a view like determinism is that the agents would simply not be 
morally responsible, in which case they would not be worthy of blame 
whatsoever, and thus no one—not God or anyone else—could legitimately 
blame them. Todd’s path to this conclusion is to prioritize his intuition 
about divine blame within theological determinism, and then to offer as 
the best explanation of this intuition—better than any alleged problem 
with God’s distinctive standing to blame—the proposal that moral re-
sponsibility requires a kind of free will that creatures would lack if they 
were determined by God to act as they do.25
But this conclusion is too hasty. For there is another interpretation of 
the apparent problem for theological determinism that has thus far been 
left out of the discussion, one that makes better sense of the judgment that 
divine blame would be especially inappropriate if God determines the 
misbehavior. Key to this construal of the problem is an assumption about 
the nature of blame itself, namely, that the act of blaming involves making 
a certain kind of demand of those blamed—a demand that, as we will see, 
God would be disingenuous in making if theological determinism were 
true. Among other virtues, this approach has the advantage of counting 
theological determinism as uniquely problematic for God’s standing—it 
identifies a distinctive problem in the case of the divine controller blaming 
the controlled—rather than counting all blame, divine and human alike, 
as equally problematic within a deterministic framework.
By way of introduction to this proposed alternative, look back at the 
long quote from Todd above, taking note of the language involved in 
the divine blame: “What’s your excuse? How could you?,” God asks. 
This is familiar language in our everyday blaming practices. If I hear it 
from a loved one, I recognize it as a demand to explain my behavior—to 
give an account as to why I acted as I did rather than acting otherwise. 
Furthermore, I recognize the demand as one that assumes that my ex-
planation will provide no excuse or justification for my action, but rather 
will end in my acknowledgment that I have behaved badly; indeed, in 
25This strategy raises an issue that is worth a longer discussion than I can give here. Todd 
seems to believe that the fact that a view is “massively counterintuitive” constitutes strong 
evidence that it is “overwhelmingly implausible” (“Manipulation and Moral Standing,” 16–
17); at any rate, the alleged counterintuitiveness of the claim that divine blame is legitimate 
within theological determinism is treated as good evidence in favor of its implausibility. 
But this strategy requires data and argumentation, and cannot simply be assumed. (This 
is especially true given recent research on intuitions about related issues. For discussion of 
recent work on intuitions concerning moral responsibility, see John Ross Churchill, “Intu-
ition, Orthodoxy, and Moral Responsibility.” See also Tamler Sommers’s argument in Part I of 
Relative Justice that moral responsibility intuitions vary significantly across cultures, and his 
use of this argument to defend the coherence of theological determinism and human moral 
responsibility in “Relative Responsibility and Theism.” And for recent empirical evidence 
of significant cultural variation in judgments relevant to assessing moral responsibility, see 
Clark Barrett et al., “Small-scale Societies Exhibit Fundamental Variation in the Role of Inten-
tions in Moral Judgment.”) 
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this sense the questions are more like expressions of shock or incredulity 
at my behavior than requests for information. And—to come to the key 
point—such a demand from God would seem to be deeply problematic 
within the framework of theological determinism, on the grounds that it 
would be insincere in the extreme. For surely the God who has determined 
me to sin—where such determination is the fundamental reason why I 
sin rather than refrain—cannot sincerely confront me with anything like 
shocked or incredulous demands that I explain that very sin. “How could 
you?,” in the sense intended here, cannot be expressed sincerely by the 
being who determined not only that I could, but that I would commit the 
wrong for which I am being blamed. Todd is no doubt in good company 
in finding divine blame of this sort “deeply unsettling.”26
It’s important to note that this kind of demand is by no means contrived. 
Rather, as multiple philosophers have argued of late, it is common in our 
ordinary blaming practices.27 Moreover, it appears in some presentations 
of divine blame within the Christian tradition, as in the famous “Song of 
the Vineyard” from the book of Isaiah.28 Taken at face value, that song sits 
ill with theological determinism, as God’s blaming of Israel—couched in 
questions of the form “What more could I have done?”—would thereby 
be disingenuous. (After all, on the deterministic account, there was plenty 
more God could have done to improve Israel’s behavior.)
Moreover, the apparent insincerity would be unique to God, which 
means that it would serve to constitute a specific challenge to divine blame. 
Those who initially took the apparent problem to be especially difficult for 
God’s standing will see this as fitting. It’s true, of course, that theological 
determinism is often taken to be inconsistent with human moral respon-
sibility, and therefore inconsistent with any legitimate blame, human or 
divine; Todd’s intuitions on this point are not idiosyncratic. But even so, 
some of us see in the problem of divine blame something distinctively 
problematic about God’s blaming behavior—i.e., something uniquely 
troubling about the determiner blaming the determined. This interpretation 
of the problem is preserved if we understand the difficulty as one that 
is ultimately about the apparent insincerity of the blamer. But it is lost 
on Todd’s account, which casts all blame—human and divine—as equally 
problematic under theological determinism.
26Compare Paul Russell’s charge that controllers cannot blame those they control because 
“[m]oral communication and responsiveness presupposes that agents are not related to each 
other as controller and controllee,” as well as his likening of such blame to a situation in 
which an author criticizes one of his fictional characters through a dialogue with that char-
acter. See Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 159 and 171n20, respectively. 
27See for example Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” and Angela Smith, “Re-
sponsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” 269–271, and “Control, 
Responsibility, and Moral Assessment,” 380–382. See also McKenna’s discussion of overt 
blaming in the presence of the person blamed in Conversation and Responsibility, 174–178 (esp. 
176), along with his list of the ways in which reactive attitudes manifest themselves on 67. 
28See Isaiah 5:1–7. 
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We seem, then, to have arrived at a distinctive problem for divine 
blame within theological determinism. This problem does not turn on a 
requirement that in determining the misbehavior of the agents that are 
to blame, God would be guilty of wrongdoing. Nor does it assume that 
a God who determines an agent to perform a wrong action cannot care 
about the values flouted by that wrong action. Moreover, it is a problem 
that specifically concerns God’s standing to blame those who have been 
divinely determined, rather than threatening to undermine the legitimacy 
of all blame everywhere by challenging the moral responsibility of all 
agents. This threat to divine blame is ultimately about apparent insincerity: 
it is hard to see how, on the theological determinist’s approach, God could 
legitimately blame in anything like the familiar way discussed above—i.e., 
via something like shocked or incredulous demands for explanation—
without being disingenuous.
V. A Response to the Problem
But must all divine blame include demands of this problematic sort? If 
not, then we may be on our way to a solution to the problem above, as 
there may be plausible models of divine blame on which theological de-
terminism is immune to the charge that God would be insincere.
The theological determinist is helped here by recent work in moral 
psychology on human blame. For not all models of such blame prioritize 
aspects that lead to the problem in the divine case.
There are, for example, accounts of blame that can be classified as cogni-
tive approaches in light of their emphasis on the role of certain kinds of 
judgments in our blaming practices—in particular, negative evaluations of 
the blamed person’s moral character or quality of will. Or take affective 
approaches, which prioritize the role of certain emotions—e.g., anger, re-
sentment, indignation—in their accounts of blame.29 For present purposes, 
it will suffice to point out that at least some of our blaming behavior mani-
fests either or both of the requisite cognitive or affective features, but does 
not include explicit explanatory demands of those blamed. For example, Hamlet 
blames Claudius for multiple offenses, as is evident in his anger and re-
sentment, and in his evaluation of Claudius’s vicious character and lack of 
regard for the former king. But Hamlet is uninterested in hearing Claudius 
give any account of his wrongdoing; he makes no demands—incredulous 
or otherwise—that are intended to force Claudius to acknowledge his sin. 
Closer to home, I may blame the inconsiderate stranger who jumps the 
line at the airport in virtue of my judgments about and emotions toward 
him, with no thought of making demands of the relevant sort.30
29See Coates and Tognazzini, “The Nature and Ethics of Blame,” 199–201, and “The Con-
tours of Blame,” 13–15, as well as Tognazzini and Coates, “Blame,” sections 1.1 and 1.2.
30Interestingly, Hamlet’s blame of his mother does seem to involve such demands, as we 
see in his treatment of her in the “closet scene” of Act 3 (“Have you eyes?”). Similarly, if 
it is not a stranger but my brother who jumps the airport line, I am much more likely to 
confront him and insist, incredulously, that he explain himself. These observations may be 
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Note also that there are approaches to blame that focus not on the kinds 
or contents of mental states that are characteristic of blame, but rather 
on the goals of our blaming behavior. For example, blame might best be 
understood as a kind of protest against the vice or ill will that the blamed 
person manifested in her misbehavior.31 Here again, it seems clear that 
blame can sometimes serve this function without including demands of 
the sort at issue. Indeed, the two examples just above plausibly count here 
as well, as cognitive and affective elements will likely be typical (though 
perhaps not necessary) elements of blaming activity on this approach.
These examples of blame provide a response to the problem that was 
articulated in the last section. That problem, recall, was that a God who 
determines an agent’s wrongdoing cannot sincerely confront that agent 
with anything analogous to the kind of shocked or incredulous demand 
for explanation that is common to the expression of human blame. And 
thus if divine blame involves such demands, then theological determinism 
has a problem with divine blame. But the considerations above cast doubt 
on the antecedent. For it’s not clear why we ought to insist on certain re-
quirements for divine blame that are frequently unsatisfied in ordinary 
cases of human blame. Why, that is, ought we to think God’s blaming be-
havior must involve demands of the sort above when some instances of 
legitimate human blame do not? In light of this, it’s open to the theological 
determinist to claim that divine blame need not involve such demands, 
in which case the charge of divine insincerity cannot get off the ground.
This seems to me to constitute a successful response to the challenge to 
theological determinism. It’s true, of course, that ordinary human blaming 
practices are not a surefire guide to understanding divine blame. But no 
strong principle of that sort is needed for the response above. Rather, the 
situation is this. The determinist has been presented with a challenge that 
turns on divine blame taking a certain form, which renders such blame 
problematic. The fact that ordinary practice commonly includes cases of 
blame that do not take this form is surely relevant here. For it shows that 
not all blame takes the form in question, which in turn gives us reason to 
believe that divine blame need not take it either. Barring an argument that 
divine blame must take this form—i.e., that it must include demands of the 
sort discussed above—the problem for theological determinism appears 
to have been solved.
clues that the more intimate the human relationship, the more likely it is that blame will 
involve demands of the relevant kind. Or it may suggest that our blaming practices involve 
a cluster of features that all appear together in only some instances of blame, where the more 
intimate the relationship the more features one will typically find. Regardless, much work 
would be needed to translate these considerations into a case that divine blame cannot lack 
such demands, which is the crux of the present section.
31See Coates and Tognazzini, “The Nature and Ethics of Blame,” 202, and “The Contours 
of Blame,” 15–17, as well as Tognazzini and Coates, “Blame,” section 1.4. 
437DETERMINISM AND DIVINE BLAME
VI. Theological Determinism and the Psychology of Divine Blame
Still, it’s hard to deny that such blame looks very strange, at first glance 
anyway. Even if the alleged problem of insincerity is solved, the fact 
remains that divine blame on the theological determinist’s account ap-
pears quite alien to us. Assume, for example, that God’s blaming involves 
some combination of cognitive and affective elements in the way that 
was sketched in the previous section:32 God blames Peter for the denial of 
Christ, where this includes negative moral evaluations of Peter’s character 
or concern for Christ, along with emotions like wrath directed toward 
Peter. Is there any way for us to relate to such behavior—to take up the 
perspective of a being who judges and feels like this while simultaneously 
determining the very behavior that occasions these judgments and emo-
tions? Or is such behavior simply unintelligible? William Hasker puts the 
concern nicely:
If we are told, then, that God has a deep and abiding anger at the unrighteous-
ness that takes place on the earth, our only possible response is that this 
simply cannot be: to represent God as angry and hostile to situations which 
are exactly as he wishes them to be, is just incoherent—or worse, it is to rep-
resent God as afflicted with something like schizophrenia.33
Unlike Hasker, I’m not convinced that we can proclaim divine blame of 
this sort to be impossible on the grounds of its unintelligibility. For there 
are bound to be limits on our ability to empathize with God, cognitively 
and emotionally. And the determinist seems within her rights to claim this 
as an instance where the gulf between humans and the divine precludes 
such empathy.
But the determinist need not concede this point and embrace a myste-
rian position on the matter too quickly. It’s true, of course, that we must 
beware of allowing anthropomorphism undue influence on our theology; 
a counterintuitive conclusion is not ipso facto a reductio, especially in the 
32Classical theologians count ascriptions of emotion (or certain emotions, like wrath) 
to God as mere anthropopathisms, on the grounds that genuine divine emotions (of the 
relevant sort) would violate the doctrine of divine impassibility—the doctrine that nothing 
acts upon or causally affects God. (See Wainwright, “Concepts of God,” Section 2; Murray, 
Reclaiming Divine Wrath; and Sanders, The God Who Risks, ch. 5.) Is the assumption in the text 
above inconsistent with this aspect of classical theology? Not necessarily. For it seems to me 
that an approach used by some classical theologians to explain apparent divine emotions 
can be employed here as well. In particular, a theist partial to divine impassibility could 
reinterpret talk of apparent emotions in divine blame as talk about certain divine actions. 
(See Murray, chs. 2 and 3.) So long as such actions do not amount to punishment—i.e., so 
long as instances of divine blame do not ipso facto constitute instances of divine punish-
ment—this reinterpretation could work just fine. For example, the apparent wrath involved 
in an instance of divine blame might be said to consist entirely of God’s denouncing the 
offender or his behavior. Or it may be characterized as consisting of one or more divine 
judgments—perhaps drawing on judgment-oriented accounts of natural emotions (as in de 
Souza, “Emotion,” section 5, and Prinz, Beyond Human Nature, 242–237)—in which case the 
apparent affective components of divine blame would appear to collapse into the evaluative 
components.
33William Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, 159.
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theological domain. But intelligibility here would seem to be a theoretical 
improvement, all other things being equal. And for those whose faith 
thrives best alongside understanding, it could have devotional value as 
well. So it is in the determinist’s interest to seek intelligible human ana-
logues to divine blame of the relevant sort, as a means of rendering the 
divine case intelligible.
I propose that such analogues may be found in the attitudes and re-
sponses of at least some authors toward their fictional characters. I will try 
to illustrate this proposal through examples, but before doing so it is 
important that the claims to follow not be misunderstood. To be clear, I 
will not be using the analogy below to argue that God’s goodness is con-
sistent with divine determination of human wrongdoing or with God’s 
subsequent blame for that wrongdoing. Nor will I be using it to defend 
God’s standing to blame persons for actions that have been determined in 
this way.34 These conclusions have all been defended in the two previous 
sections. My goal in this section is different: I will be presenting some real-
world, non-pathological cases in which humans seem to be judging and 
feeling in ways that are analogous to the kind of divine blame sketched 
above, where my sole purpose in doing so is to render the psychology of such 
blame intelligible. Because these human cases are similar enough to the 
divine case in relevant respects, the determinist can claim divine blame 
within theological determinism to be psychologically intelligible (and 
thereby avoid appeal to mystery on this point).
Let’s turn now to the central analogy of this section. It’s true of course 
that there are no actual cases of human persons who have total control 
over other humans’ wrongdoing and yet simultaneously blame those 
wrongdoers for their actions; a fortiori there are no cases with these features 
where the blame includes the cognitive and emotional elements discussed 
above and is intelligible, to boot. But there are, I believe, approximations 
to such cases in the attitudes of authors toward their fictional characters, 
in at least some instances. That is, we find some fiction writers that exer-
cise complete sovereignty over the behavior of their characters, and yet 
nevertheless judge or respond emotionally to those characters—and all in 
ways that resemble the elements of the account of blame sketched in the 
section above. Take Joseph Heller, for example, on his attitudes toward 
some of his characters:
I told several people while I was writing the book that Slocum was pos-
sibly the most contemptible character in literature. Before I was finished, 
I began feeling sorry for him. That has happened to me before. That’s why 
there are two generals in Catch-22. General Dreedle certainly had bad quali-
ties, but then there were certain characteristics I liked (he was straightfor-
ward, honest, not a conniver), and I found I didn’t want to attribute certain 
34Todd uses the author analogy for these purposes in “Manipulation and Moral Standing,” 
7. Relatedly, McCann uses the author analogy to argue that divine determination is consis-
tent with human moral responsibility in Creation and the Sovereignty of God, 107–108. 
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unsympathetic qualities to him. So I invented General Peckem as a sort of 
substitute scapegoat. Very hard to like him.35
Note that Heller refers to moral evaluations (“contemptible,” “honest”) 
of what are, first to last, his own creations. We see something similar in 
other authors, as in Vladimir Nabokov’s evaluation of character Humbert 
Humbert as “a vain and cruel wretch who manages to appear ‘touching.’”36
I suspect, however, that it is the emotional elements of divine blame 
within theological determinism, and not the cognitive elements, that are 
apt to seem most puzzling. In other words, my suspicion is that divine 
wrath (resentment, etc.) toward those who have been determined to act 
wrongly will seem less intelligible than God’s negative moral evaluation 
of the action or the agent’s character. (See for example Hasker’s focus on 
divine emotions in the quote above.) On this point, then, Heller’s discus-
sion of his emotional responses (“I began feeling sorry for him,” “hard 
to like”) to his creations are especially relevant. We might also contrast 
J. K. Rowling’s responses to the deaths of characters Bellatrix LeStrange 
(“Being able to kill her was a pleasure”) and new father Remus Lupin 
(“the only time my editor ever saw me cry”).37 Indeed, while it is certainly 
not a universal feature of fiction writing, there seem to be quite a few 
authors who respond emotionally to the actions and fates of characters 
that are entirely at their command. For some, like John Irving, this aspect 
of writing seems to cast a pall over much of the process:
I can’t say I have fun writing. My stories are sad to me, and comic too, but 
largely unhappy. I feel badly for the characters—that is, if the story’s any 
good. Writing a novel is actually searching for victims. As I write I keep 
looking for casualties. The stories uncover the casualties.38
I hope the relevance of these examples is clear. God’s blaming activity 
on theological determinism may prima facie seem unintelligible, as it may 
appear impossible to relate to the practice of evaluating and (especially) 
responding emotionally to behavior that one has determined oneself. But 
we find approximations to such practices in the judgments and emotions 
of many fiction writers. And while it may be difficult for some of us to 
relate to such authors in these respects, there nevertheless seems to be 
no good reason to describe their behavior as unintelligible. But then we 
have found what we were seeking, namely, a psychologically intelligible 
human analogue to the kind of divine blame in question. It is not a perfect 
analogy, to be sure. But it doesn’t need to be perfect. It only needs to show 
35Heller, “The Art of Fiction No. 51.” 
36Nabokov, “The Art of Fiction No. 40.” 
37See Rowling, “I’ve Really Exhausted the Magical,” and Loughrey, “J. K. Rowling Apolo-
gizes for Killing Off Remus Lupin in Harry Potter,” respectively. Note that Rowling specifies 
that her tears were over the fate of Teddy Lupin, the infant son of Remus, upon his father’s 
death. Even so, the point holds: pleasure is taken in the death of the wicked, displeasure in 
the death of the virtuous. 
38Irving, “The Art of Fiction No. 93.”
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the intelligibility of thinking and feeling towards one’s creations in ways 
that sufficiently approximate the relevant kind of divine blame, so as to 
make such blame itself intelligible. And this it does.
One might worry that the divine case is too dissimilar to the proposed 
human analogue for the analogy to serve its purpose, contrary to my claim 
just above. Particular concern might come from the fact that in our en-
gagement with fiction, either as authors or consumers, we believe of the 
characters that they are fictional, i.e., merely imaginary. But the human tar-
gets of God’s blame are as real as can be, and (obviously) God takes them 
to be so. Doesn’t this imply a difference that is sufficient to undermine the 
analogy?
It does not. To see why, it’s important to keep in mind that my sole aim 
in using the analogy is to defend the psychological intelligibility of divine 
blame within theological determinism, where such blame is assumed to 
be the evaluative and emotional sort discussed above. The analogy high-
lights the similarity between divine blame (so understood) and cases of 
human authors blaming their fictional characters, with the conclusion 
that this similarity is such that the intelligibility of the human case ren-
ders God’s blame intelligible as well. And, to return to the worry at hand, 
while it is certainly true that we believe of fictional characters that they 
are merely imaginary, it’s nevertheless plausible that fiction provokes in 
us real emotional and evaluative attitudes toward those characters.39 This 
may be puzzling, but it seems to be a puzzling fact about us. Colin Radford 
captured this fact nicely many years ago, noting that while we do not rush 
the stage to stop Tybalt’s violent behavior—we know we are watching a 
play, after all—we respond with genuine emotion to what we see:
We shed real tears for Mercutio. They are not crocodile tears, they are 
dragged from us and they are not the sort of tears that are produced by 
cigarette smoke in the theatre. . . . We are appalled when we realise what 
may happen, and are horrified when it does. Indeed, we may be so appalled 
at the prospect of what we think is going to happen to a character in a novel 
or a play that some of us can’t go on. We avert the impending tragedy in the 
only way we can, by closing the book, or leaving the theatre.40
This kind of sorrow for fictional victims is matched by our indignation 
toward and condemnation of fictional villains, to come back to emotions 
and evaluations that are more relevant to our discussion. And as seems 
clear in the writers used as examples above, these attitudes are not limited 
to consumers of fiction, but extend to the authors of the works as well. 
39See for example Gendler, “Imagination,” section 5.3, and Neill, “Fiction and the Emo-
tions.” Note however that there is not perfect consensus about this; see Kendall Walton’s 
“Fearing Fictions” for dissent. Note also that some who work in this area believe that we 
respond to fiction with genuine emotions, but we are irrational in doing so. Radford is em-
blematic here—see his “How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?”—and thus 
my use of his work in the text should not be taken as an endorsement of the entirety of his 
position.
40Radford, “How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?,” 70. See also 71.
441DETERMINISM AND DIVINE BLAME
Moreover, this all seems perfectly intelligible, regardless of whether one 
is a consumer or an author of the work. But then all the pieces are in place 
for the analogy to succeed in its aim, as we have intelligible cases in which 
persons blame that over which they exercise complete control.
It may clarify matters to note that the fictional aspects of the human 
analogue would matter a great deal more if the hope were to defend the 
intelligibility of God’s punishing those who have been divinely determined. 
For insofar as it even makes sense to punish fictional characters, such pun-
ishment would presumably have to take place within the fictional story, 
and thus the punishment would be just as imaginary as the characters 
themselves. But blame, as understood here, is as real as can be, whether 
targeted at fictional or actual objects. This makes the analogy to God’s 
blame apt in the present case, even if it would fail to support a similar 
conclusion about divine punishment.41
Alternatively, one might object to the analogy on the grounds that a fic-
tion writer’s creative process is one in which the characters take on “a life 
of their own,” as it were, dictating the course of the story rather than falling 
under the strict control of the author. In response, it’s certainly true that 
some writers talk this way—Khaled Hosseini,42 for example, and perhaps 
E. M. Forster.43 But it’s hard to know just how seriously to take this kind 
of language. More to the point, however, even if some authors speak this 
way, there are others who describe the creative process very differently, 
including some of those cited earlier in support of the analogy. A colorful 
example comes from Nabokov, commenting snidely on the idea that char-
acters exercise this kind of “control”:
My knowledge of Mr. Forster’s works is limited to one novel, which I dislike; 
and anyway, it was not he who fathered that trite little whimsy about char-
acters getting out of hand; it is as old as the quills, although of course one 
sympathizes with his people if they try to wriggle out of that trip to India or 
wherever he takes them. My characters are galley slaves.
Given that at least some authors respond evaluatively and emotionally, 
in the relevant ways, to characters whose behavior they have determined 
completely, the analogy is fitting.
41Most people who are concerned about determinism and divine blame will also be con-
cerned about determinism and divine punishment. Thus, some readers may be disappointed 
that I have not explicitly defended God’s standing to punish those who have been divinely 
determined, and similarly, that I have defended the intelligibility of divine blame via a pro-
posal that seems irrelevant to the intelligibility of divine punishment. In response, I’ll just 
reiterate something I said in an earlier section: because I count issues concerning divine 
blame and issues concerning divine punishment as related but distinct, I don’t expect that 
what illuminates our thinking about the one will always illuminate our thinking about the 
other. Even so, I count it worthwhile to seek improvements in our understanding of the one, 
even if these do not immediately yield the same amount or kind of improvement in the other.
42See Hosseini, “‘Kite Runner’ Author On His Childhood, His Writing, And The Plight Of 
Afghan Refugees.”
43Nabokov, “The Art of Fiction No. 40.”
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But what if the human analogues were much more similar to the di-
vine case? In other words, what if we consider not real human authors, 
but fantastic “superhuman” authors, who—somewhat like the narrator in 
Breakfast of Champions—have the power to create and control real worlds, 
with real people performing real actions? Suppose also that these authors 
blame the creations that are under their control. Do we find such blame 
intelligible? If not, we have the makings of another objection: when we 
make the analogous human (or superhuman) blame much more similar 
to the divine case, that blame ceases to be intelligible; but the best analogy 
should comprise analogues that are as similar as possible in relevant re-
spects; therefore, we cannot argue by analogy that the divine blame of 
interest here is intelligible.
I think we should resist this line of thought. For I can’t think of a better 
way to evaluate the intelligibility of the outlandish superhuman blame than 
to think about the superhuman author’s creation, control, and blame as 
being substantially similar to a normal author’s process. And if this is our 
approach, then we should judge the blame in the fantastic case to be in-
telligible, just as we do in the case of normal human authors. Thus, even 
if we switch to the more exotic analogue—and I’m not convinced that we 
should—the analogy still supports the conclusion that divine blame within 
theological determinism is intelligible.
That said, there may be one way in which our judgments about su-
perhuman authorship and normal authorship vary significantly, over and 
above the obvious difference in the authors’ abilities. In particular, we (or 
many of us) may judge that a superhuman author, unlike a normal au-
thor, is doing something morally wrong in creating as she does. For, as we 
have imagined her, she brings real people into existence, with real lives 
that include wrongdoing and (presumably) suffering. But crucially, she 
does this without the knowledge, wisdom, power, and moral perfection 
that are present in God’s creative and providential acts. And some might 
take these divine qualities to be necessary conditions on morally permis-
sible creation (regardless, perhaps, of whether the creator determines the 
creatures’ behavior or instead allows them to lead “lives of their own.”) 
The important thing to see for present purposes is that even if you judge 
superhuman authors to be acting immorally, this is irrelevant to the main 
argument of this section. For the goal of the present section—the end that 
the central analogy serves—is to defend the intelligibility of divine blame 
within theological determinism, not to defend God’s goodness within this 
approach. (Defense of the latter has been provided by others, and was 
reviewed to some extent in section IV.) And neither the objection we have 
just considered, nor the previous two objections, give us reason to doubt 
the intelligibility of such blame.
Appeal to mystery is unavoidable for the Christian theist. But the timing 
of that appeal will vary, depending on one’s theology. The upshot of the 
above is that theological determinists can, if they wish, delay mysterianism 
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a little longer than it might initially have appeared, in light of the fact that 
divine blame on their account is intelligible after all.
VII. Conclusion
Although the term “theological determinism” may not be common in the 
pews, the position that it names has long been a part of select Christian 
denominations. These denominations tend not to prioritize passages like 
the “Song of the Vineyard” from Isaiah when articulating their doctrine 
of divine sovereignty, and such passages are typically not interpreted as a 
realistic depiction of divine psychology. Far more priority is given instead 
to passages like Romans 9, which is often interpreted as an endorsement 
of both theological determinism and legitimate divine blame, and which 
famously includes the following:
You will say to me then, “Why then does he still find fault? For who can 
resist his will?” But who indeed are you, a human being, to argue with God? 
Will what is molded say to the one who molds it, “Why have you made me 
like this?”44
The sentiments in this and similar passages,45 so interpreted, raise a number 
of philosophical questions. In previous sections I have argued for the ap-
propriateness of divine blame, and presented real-world human analogues 
in an effort to render such blame intelligible. But many other important 
questions have been bracketed here. Human moral responsibility has been 
assumed rather than defended; the justness of divine punishment has been 
left unaddressed; and the question of how to respond to the problem of 
evil has been given only a passing glance. Thus, philosophically-minded 
Christians must look elsewhere for answers to these other questions—or 
propose new solutions of their own.46
44Romans 9: 19–20, NRSV.
45For discussion of more Biblical passages often taken to support Christian theological 
determinism, see Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Moral Responsibility, and Feinberg, 
No One Like Him, 677–714. 
46For treatment of one or more of these issues, see Churchill, “Intuition, Orthodoxy, and 
Moral responsibility,” 188–189; Cowan and Welty, “Pharaoh’s Magicians Redivivus,” 163–164 
and 168–172; Edwards, Freedom of the Will, part IV; Feinberg, No One Like Him, chs. 14 and 
16; Flint, “Two Accounts of Providence,” 169–170, and “Divine Providence,” 269; Helm, The 
Providence of God, chs. 7 and 8, and Eternal God, 144–164; McCann, Creation and the Sovereignty 
of God, chs. 5 and 6; and Sommers, “Relative Responsibility and Theism.” Also relevant are 
recent defenses of non-libertarian approaches to the problem of evil in John Martin Fischer, 
“Libertarianism and the Problem of Flip-flopping,” 61n14, T. J. Mawson, “Classical Theism 
has No Implications for the Debate between Libertarianism and Compatibilism,” 148–150, 
and O’Connor, “Against Theological Determinism,” 134–135. (Exposition of contemporary 
non-libertarian approaches to moral responsibility may likewise be of interest; see McKenna 
and Coates, “Compatibilism,” for a thorough overview, and ch. 8 of Valerie Tiberius’s Moral 
Psychology for a brief introduction.) For objections to theological determinism that do not 
turn on challenges to divine blame, see the references just above to O’Connor (135–140) and 
Mawson (154); see also Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, chs. 2–3 and appendix 5; Flint, 
Divine Providence, 90–94, and “Divine Providence,” 268–269; Neal Judisch, “Theological De-
terminism and the Problem of Evil” and “Divine Conservation and Creaturely Freedom,” 
239–243; Katherin Rogers, “The Divine Controller Argument for Incompatibilism”; Sanders, 
444 Faith and Philosophy
Progress here, whether in the form of new proposals or of renewed 
comprehension and timely application of the old, is to be welcomed for 
two reasons. The first stems from the fact, mentioned above, that theo-
logical determinism has long been common among theologians, clergy, 
and laity alike. Those Christian philosophers interested in defending a 
“big tent” vision of the rationality of Christian belief—and who wouldn’t 
want to be in that number?—will thus want to defend this common po-
sition against charges that it suffers from one or another defeater. The 
second is that this approach to divine sovereignty, unlike some alterna-
tive approaches, does not require that humans have libertarian free will 
in order to be morally responsible. On Christian theological determinism, 
our responsibility is compatible with a wide range of discoveries in the 
science of human agency, rather than being hostage to the truth of some 
rather risky empirical hypotheses.47 It seems only prudent, therefore, for 
Christian philosophers to try to meet the various challenges to theological 
determinism, regardless of their personal inclinations on the position. Or 
anyway, it seems prudent for those keen to give moral responsibility—a 
central commitment across Christian denominations—an especially firm 
foundation.48
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